Protocols

Federated sidechainliquid.net

Active; L-BTC peg-outs paused since the 6 Sep 2026 exploit (liquid.net notice, seen 16 Oct 2026), with about 602 BTC of federation reserves still subject to recovery (Blockstream assessment, 23 Sep 2026).

How it works

Federated Bitcoin sidechain built on Elements. Confidential Transactions hide amounts and asset types by default. L-BTC is issued against BTC held by the federation: a peg-in needs 102 Bitcoin confirmations, and watchmen pay peg-outs in batches with a greater than two-thirds signing threshold. Blocks arrive about every minute and need signatures from at least two-thirds of block signers; Blockstream's assessment says blocks need signatures from at least 11 of the 15 functionary nodes. A set of three emergency keys can reach funds after a timelock if the network stops functioning for an extended period.

What can be measured

L-BTC supply (peg-ins minus peg-outs minus burns) and the cumulative number and volume of peg-ins and peg-outs; the federation's bitcoin reserves from liquid.network's audit.

Collected by PriFi.info every day and charted above. Latest reading, 17 Oct 2026, 01:22 UTC: supply 4,234.76 L-BTC; 117,346 peg-ins totalling 18,387.58 BTC; 10,414 peg-outs totalling 14,142.80 BTC; 10.03 L-BTC burned. Federation reserves 3,632.23 BTC (liquid.network, 18 Oct 2026).

Public data: blockstream.info, tested. Blockstream's Esplora API is free to use without authentication, with rate limits (Liquid documentation, updated 1 Jun 2026), and states no licence for the data, which is public chain data. liquid.network's terms (updated 10 Jul 2024) cover the site and its API, state no licence for reusing its data and make no guarantee of its accuracy.

Not measurable

Amounts and asset types inside confidential transactions, and how much L-BTC custodians hold.

Worth knowing

Because the recovery reorganisation removed the exploit transactions from the Liquid chain, the Liquid-side supply does not include the 3,996.02 BTC paid out on Bitcoin. Blockstream's assessment does not say whether any user lost funds.

Incidents

1. 6 Sep 2026 Exploit Rangeproof cache flaw used to create about 4,000 unbacked L-BTC and withdraw 3,996.02 BTC

   Blockstream's assessment says two bugs in the Elements rangeproof verification cache (Bug A, from a 2018 commit, reported on 2 Aug 2026 and fixed on the production bridge nodes on 3 Aug 2026, and Bug B, a flaw in that fix) let a transaction in Liquid block 4,050,336 at 13:53 UTC create about 4,000 L-BTC with no bitcoin behind it. The L-BTC was pegged out through SideSwap, a federation member holding a peg-out authorisation key; Blockstream says SideSwap kept that key online although the federation charter requires it to be kept offline, and applied no size limit, velocity control or wallet-history check. Federation signers released 3,996.02 BTC on Bitcoin, confirmed at 14:28 UTC (transaction 8db751a6...), and Blockstream took the Liquid bridge nodes offline at 18:26 UTC. The attacker, who described themselves on chain as whitehats, returned 3,400 BTC on 7 Sep 2026 at 16:09 UTC (transaction a6d697a2...). Elements v23.3.4 was published on 9 Sep 2026 and block production resumed that day on a corrected chain with a replacement block 4,050,336, from which the invalid outputs and the transactions built on them were removed; user transactions resumed on 10 Sep 2026 with peg-outs still disabled. Blockstream says no key was compromised, that the payout and smaller peg-outs confirmed before the halt took the reserve from about 4,205 BTC to 197 BTC, that no inflation from either bug remains on the current chain, and that about 602 BTC remains subject to recovery efforts.

   Sources: Liquid Network Security Incident Assessment Blockstream, 23 Sep 2026; Bitcoin transaction 8db751a6 (83 federation inputs, 3,996.01834922 BTC output, block 965,783) Blockstream Esplora API, 6 Sep 2026; Bitcoin transaction a6d697a2 (3,400 BTC to the federation address, block 965,950) Blockstream Esplora API, 7 Sep 2026

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Desktop walletwasabiwallet.io

Active; no default coordinator since 1 Jun 2024, users choose a third-party coordinator.

How it works

Open-source desktop wallet that runs WabiSabi coinjoins through a coordinator the user chooses, with all communication over Tor by default. Since v2.0.8 the coordinator URI can be set in settings; since v2.2.0.0 the client only joins rounds in which it pays mining fees alone, with no coordination fee. It can send to silent payment addresses but cannot yet receive them, and the send field accepts PayJoin URLs.

What can be measured

Latest release and date (software activity); the project publishes no coinjoin volume.

Latest release v2.8.4, published on 13 Oct 2026 (feed checked on 16 Oct 2026).

Public data: github.com, tested. Public GitHub feed; GitHub terms apply.

Not measurable

Total coinjoin volume across coordinators, from any free API.

Worth knowing

v2.1.0.0 (10 Jul 2024) let clients set their own minimum input count and maximum coordination fee policies to protect against malicious coordinators, and v2.8.4 (13 Oct 2026) moved the coordinator to the native WabiSabi implementation and checks output scripts against the inputs of every round.

Incidents

1. 27 Apr 2024 zkSNACKs bars US users from Wasabi Wallet and its services

   zkSNACKs announced that, effective immediately and until further notice, it was blocking US citizens and residents from visiting its websites and from downloading and using Wasabi Wallet and related products and services, including APIs and RPC interfaces, 'in light of recent announcements by U.S. authorities'. It applied IP address blocking on wasabiwallet.io, api.wasabiwallet.io and zksnacks.com.

   Source: zkSNACKs is Now Blocking U.S. Residents and Citizens (Internet Archive copy) Wasabi Wallet blog (zkSNACKs), 27 Apr 2024

2. 1 Jun 2024 Shutdown zkSNACKs default coordinator discontinued

   zkSNACKs announced on 2 May 2024 that it would shut down its coinjoin coordination service from 1 Jun 2024, saying it had always tried to operate under legal clarity and needed 'to regain more certainty before moving forward'. It said users of other clients that connect to its coordinator, such as Trezor Suite and BTCPay Server, were also affected, and that Wasabi would keep working as a regular wallet. The Wasabi v2.0.8 release notes state: 'As of June 1st 2024, the default coinjoin coordination service provided by zkSNACKs is being discontinued.' The same release added a settings field for a user-chosen coordinator, and the repository moved from zkSNACKs to its own WalletWasabi organisation.

   Sources: zkSNACKs is Discontinuing its Coinjoin Coordination Service 1st of June (Internet Archive copy) Wasabi Wallet blog (zkSNACKs), 2 May 2024; Wasabi Wallet v2.0.8 release GitHub, WalletWasabi, 1 Jun 2024

3. 9 Dec 2024 WabiSabi flaw let a malicious coordinator link users' coins

   The Ginger Wallet team (GingerPrivacy) disclosed that a malicious coordinator could send different round parameters to different clients and so sort inputs and outputs into groups by credential issuer, linking users to their coins and, because round status is shared across the app, linking activity across wallets in the same client. It listed Ginger Wallet v2.0.13 or below, Wasabi Wallet v2.2.1.0 or below and the BTCPay coinjoin plugin 1.0.101.0 or below as affected, said it believed the flaw was not being actively exploited after tests of three popular coordinators, and named no fixed version.

   Source: Vulnerability Report: Privacy Issue in WabiSabi Protocol (discussion #116) GitHub, GingerPrivacy, 9 Dec 2024

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Coinjoin coordinatorkruw.io

Active.

How it works

Community-run WabiSabi coordinator that Wasabi users add as the coordinator URI https://coinjoin.kruw.io/. Minimum input 0.0001 BTC; its quick-connect string sets absoluteMinInputCount=21 (Wasabi clients have been able to set their own minimum input count policy since v2.1.0.0). The page does not mention a coordinator fee; current Wasabi clients only join rounds in which they pay mining fees alone (Wasabi FAQ).

What can be measured

Inputs registered per round and round phase for current and just-ended rounds (live snapshot only, no history or volume).

On 16 Oct 2026 at 07:33 UTC: five rounds listed, three ended (111, 104 and 104 inputs), one in output registration (100 inputs) and one in input registration (29 inputs).

Public data: coinjoin.kruw.io, tested. Public JSON endpoint; no terms or licence stated on kruw.io.

Not measurable

Completed rounds, volume or fees over time.

Worth knowing

The page does not name the operator or say what the operator can see; the 9 Dec 2024 WabiSabi disclosure (see Wasabi Wallet) showed that a malicious coordinator could link users' coins by sending different round parameters to different clients.

Incidents

None found when checked on 16 Oct 2026.

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Desktop wallet and coordinatorgingerwallet.io

Active; the site says the service is not available to US citizens.

How it works

Desktop fork of Wasabi Wallet, created in 2024, that uses its own WabiSabi coordinator (https://api.gingerwallet.io/) by default. Coordinator fee of 0.3% plus mining fees on coins above 0.03 BTC; inputs of 0.03 BTC or less and remixes are exempt.

What can be measured

Inputs registered per round and round phase on the default coordinator (live snapshot only, no history or volume).

On 16 Oct 2026 at 07:34 UTC: one round in input registration, with no inputs registered yet.

Public data: api.gingerwallet.io, tested. Public JSON endpoint on the coordinator address the site lists; no terms for it found on gingerwallet.io.

Not measurable

Completed rounds, volume or fee income.

Worth knowing

The site gives 'legal uncertainties' as the reason US citizens cannot use the service. Ginger's team published the 9 Dec 2024 WabiSabi disclosure (see Wasabi Wallet).

Incidents

None found when checked on 16 Oct 2026.

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Peer-to-peer coinjoin marketgithub.com/JoinMarket-Org

Archived 27 Apr 2026; final release v0.9.12, no further updates.

How it works

Maker and taker coinjoin market for Bitcoin without a central coordinator: takers create coinjoins with makers who are always available and are paid a fee, makers can use fidelity bonds against sybil attacks, and bots negotiate mostly peer to peer over Tor onion services, with directory nodes. v0.9.12 fixed commitments checking, the mechanism that helps stop takers flooding or snooping on makers with too many requests.

What can be measured

Release activity (final release; repository archived).

Final release v0.9.12, published on 21 Apr 2026; the repository was archived on 27 Apr 2026 (feed checked on 16 Oct 2026).

Public data: github.com, tested. Public GitHub feed; GitHub terms apply.

Not measurable

The usual live measure, a public orderbook watcher (offers, makers and fidelity bonds): the clearnet mirror the README lists returned HTTP 404 on 16 Oct 2026, and most watchers run as Tor onion services.

Incidents

1. 27 Apr 2026 Shutdown Reference implementation archived with a warning to users

   The v0.9.12 release notes say the project 'has not been under active development for a considerable time' and is being archived, with the code and releases left in place but no further updates, and warn: 'Do not continue to use the code without having independent confidence that it is not exploitable'. They point to joinmarket-ng as an alternative codebase under active development, while saying this is not a recommendation either. GitHub shows the repository archived by the owner on 27 Apr 2026.

   Sources: v0.9.12: Final release of joinmarket-clientserver GitHub, JoinMarket-Org, 21 Apr 2026; joinmarket-clientserver repository (archive notice) GitHub, JoinMarket-Org, 27 Apr 2026

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Mobile wallet and mixing services

Shut down; servers and domain seized 24 Apr 2024, founders sentenced in November 2025.

How it works

Mobile wallet built around two services described by prosecutors: Whirlpool, which coordinated batches of Bitcoin exchanges between groups of users so that the source of funds was obscured, and Ricochet, which added extra intermediate transactions (hops) between sender and recipient. Samourai operated both and collected fees for them.

What can be measured

None; service offline.

Worth knowing

No clemency decision was found: the Justice Department's clemency list, updated 9 Sep 2026, does not list either founder (checked 16 Oct 2026). Ashigaru's 23 Jun 2025 announcement describes Ashigaru Whirlpool as an implementation of Samourai Wallet's Whirlpool.

Incidents

1. 24 Apr 2024 Prosecution Founders arrested, servers and domain seized

   The US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed an indictment charging chief executive Keonne Rodriguez and chief technology officer William Lonergan Hill with conspiracy to commit money laundering and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, alleging over $2 billion in unlawful transactions and more than $100 million in money laundering transactions. Rodriguez was arrested in the US and Hill in Portugal. Samourai's web servers and the samourai.io domain were seized in coordination with authorities in Iceland, and a seizure warrant served on the Google Play Store made the app unavailable for download in the US.

   Source: Founders And CEO Of Cryptocurrency Mixing Service Arrested And Charged With Money Laundering And Unlicensed Money Transmitting Offenses US Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, 24 Apr 2024

2. 30 Jul 2025 Prosecution Founders plead guilty

   Rodriguez and Hill pleaded guilty on 30 Jul 2025 before US District Judge Denise L. Cote to participating in a conspiracy to operate a money transmitting business that transmitted crime proceeds. The release, issued on 6 Aug 2025, describes Samourai as "a cryptocurrency mixer that facilitated more than $200 million in illegal transactions".

   Source: Founders Of Samourai Wallet Cryptocurrency Mixing Service Plead Guilty US Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, 6 Aug 2025

3. 19 Nov 2025 Court ruling Founders sentenced to five and four years

   Judge Cote sentenced Rodriguez to five years in prison on 6 Nov 2025 and Hill to four years on 19 Nov 2025, each with three years of supervised release and a $250,000 fine. The release says over $237 million of criminal proceeds were laundered through Samourai, that more than 80,000 BTC (over $2 billion at the time) passed through Ricochet (launched 2017) and Whirlpool (from 2019), that fees were estimated at more than $6 million, and that the two paid $6,367,139.69 in forfeiture, representing Samourai's fees, in satisfaction of an order to forfeit $237,832,360.55.

   Source: Founders Of Samourai Wallet Cryptocurrency Mixing Service Sentenced To Five And Four Years In Prison US Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, 19 Nov 2025

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Wallet apps and coordinatorashigaru.rs

Active; Ashigaru Whirlpool coordinator announced 23 Jun 2025.

How it works

Open-source Bitcoin apps (Ashigaru Mobile for Android, Ashigaru Terminal for desktop) that join 'coordinated, Zerolink coinjoins' through the Ashigaru Whirlpool protocol, connect to a user's Dojo node and broadcast over Tor. The project's 23 Jun 2025 announcement describes Ashigaru Whirlpool as an implementation of Samourai Wallet's Whirlpool built by forking Samourai's code base: Tor only, with 0.25 BTC and 0.025 BTC pools, a fixed anti-Sybil fee of 5% of the pool size and at most 20 UTXOs per Tx0. Downloads and the code repository are reached over Tor.

What can be measured

None found; no public pool or round statistics on the clearnet site.

Worth knowing

The announcement says the coordinator keeps Tx0 IDs and the TxIDs of eligible remixers in a database and that Tor identity isolation stops it linking input and output registration by session; it gives no full list of what the coordinator can see. The project names no individual maintainers.

Incidents

None found when checked on 16 Oct 2026.

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Coinjoin over Nostrjoinstr.xyz

Active; usable on mainnet according to its FAQ.

How it works

Coinjoin coordinated over Nostr relays instead of a central coordinator. Whoever creates a pool sets its denomination and number of peers; participants pay mining fees plus any paid-relay fee, and the site says 'There is no coordinator taking a cut.' Clients include an Electrum plugin, an Android app (joinstr-kmp), an Umbrel app, the joinstrd daemon with a REST API and CLI, a Sparrow build with joinstr and the rust-joinstr library.

What can be measured

Pool announcements on Nostr relays (needs a relay client to count); no HTTP statistics endpoint found.

Worth knowing

The site warns that untrusted Electrum servers affect privacy when using the Electrum plugin. It gives no release dates, usage statistics, audits or incidents (checked 16 Oct 2026).

Incidents

None found when checked on 16 Oct 2026.

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Reusable payment addressessilentpayments.xyz

BIP 352 status Complete; several wallets send or receive; Bitcoin Core merged base BIP 352 code on 23 Sep 2026 but sending and receiving remain in open pull requests.

How it works

Static, reusable payment address. For each payment the sender derives a fresh taproot output from its input keys and the recipient's scan and spend keys, so no reused address appears on chain and no notification transaction is needed. Recipients must scan transactions to find payments, either themselves or by sharing the scan key with a server. BIP 375 (Draft) covers sending with PSBTs.

What can be measured

Not measurable on chain (outputs look like other taproot outputs); adoption tracked through wallet support lists.

Worth knowing

A server that scans for a wallet holds its scan key: silentpayments.xyz says Sparrow, which since 2.5.0 (21 May 2026) receives silent payments through a public Frigate server by default, sends that server the scan private key, and the server's operator can see every payment the wallet receives while connected. Wallet support other than Sparrow, Wasabi and Bitcoin Core is as listed by the community-maintained silentpayments.xyz (updated 30 Sep 2026): send and receive in BlindBit Desktop (alpha), Cake Wallet, Dana Wallet (experimental) and Sparrow; send only in BitBox, BlueWallet, Nunchuk and Wasabi.

Incidents

None found when checked on 16 Oct 2026.

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Two-party payment transactionspayjoin.org

BIP 78 Deployed; BIP 77 (Async Payjoin) Draft; payjoin library 1.0 released 12 Aug 2026.

How it works

Sender and receiver both contribute inputs to the payment transaction, which breaks the assumption that all inputs belong to the payer. BIP 78 needs the receiver to run an online endpoint; BIP 77 relays the exchange through an untrusted directory server (payjoin-mailroom, which anyone can host) reached over Oblivious HTTP, so the two sides need not be online at the same time.

What can be measured

None: payjoins are designed to look like ordinary transactions and no public usage statistics were found.

Worth knowing

The 1.0 announcement names Bull Bitcoin Mobile and Cake Wallet as pilot integrations, without saying which BIP each uses, and says payjoin-mailroom is not yet stable. Sparrow has supported BIP 78 payjoin since 0.9.7 (12 Nov 2020) and Wasabi's send field accepts PayJoin URLs; BTCPay Server supports BIP 78 for merchants who enable it with a hot wallet.

Incidents

None found when checked on 16 Oct 2026.

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Ark implementationsecond.tech

Live on Bitcoin mainnet since 9 Jun 2026.

How it works

Ark implementation in which users hold off-chain virtual UTXOs (VTXOs) issued in rounds by an Ark server, keep an emergency exit to claim funds on chain if the server is unavailable, and use the server as a Lightning gateway. A receiver of an Ark payment assumes the sender and server do not collude to double-spend until the VTXO is refreshed in a later round. Second makes no privacy claims on the pages read.

What can be measured

None public: no mainnet server URL, explorer or statistics published.

Not measurable

Users, VTXO value outstanding or round volume.

Worth knowing

What the Ark server can see about payers, payees and amounts is not documented on the pages read, so the privacy level is unconfirmed. Expired VTXOs can be swept by the server, and recovering them depends on its cooperation.

Incidents

None found when checked on 16 Oct 2026.

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.

Ark-based protocolarkadeos.com

Live on Bitcoin mainnet (operator reports network 'bitcoin'); public beta launch reported on 21 Oct 2025; intents in a mainnet developer preview.

How it works

Ark-based protocol by Ark Labs described as 'an open, programmable extension of Bitcoin'. An operator evaluates and co-signs authorised off-chain transactions, which settle on Bitcoin in batches; the site says it cannot take funds, and the docs say users can withdraw to Bitcoin L1 unilaterally even if the operator goes offline. Arkade's security documentation says communication between users and the Arkade Signer is designed to support end-to-end encryption that stops the operator from seeing which specific transactions are processed, blocking transactions by content or analysing user behaviour patterns; this is the project's own description and was not independently tested.

What can be measured

Operator parameters: software version, network, VTXO and UTXO limits, session length, exit delays (no volume or value held).

On 16 Oct 2026 at 07:38 UTC: operator software v0.9.22 on network bitcoin; VTXO and UTXO amounts from 330 to 50,000,000 sats; unilateral exit delay 605,184 seconds, about 7 days.

Public data: arkade.computer, tested. Public operator endpoint; no terms stated on the docs pages read.

Not measurable

Users, VTXO value or batch volume.

Worth knowing

The end-to-end encryption claim covers communication with the Arkade Signer; the pages read do not say what the operator can infer from batch settlement on chain. The public beta date is reported by The Block, and whether the beta label still applies was not confirmed.

Incidents

None found when checked on 16 Oct 2026.

Checked on 16 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed.