PriFi.info

Wasabi Wallet

An open-source desktop bitcoin wallet that builds WabiSabi coinjoins through a coordinator; its developer's default coordinator shut down in June 2024, and users now choose independent ones.

LiveCoinjoin

Maintained, with release 2.8.4 on 13 October 2026; there has been no default coordinator since 1 June 2024, so users choose an independent coordinator, which since version 2.2.0.0 must charge no coordination fee.

Launched
31 Oct 2018
Token
None
Chains
Bitcoin

Checked on 23 Oct 2026. Information only, not investment advice.

How it works

Wasabi Wallet is an open-source bitcoin wallet for Windows, macOS and Linux that mixes the user's coins in coinjoins: single transactions that combine coins from many users, organised by a server called a coordinator, so that an observer cannot tell which outputs belong to which inputs. Its developer at the time, the company zkSNACKs, released version 1.0 on 31 October 2018 as an implementation of ZeroLink, the framework for coordinated coinjoins that Adam Ficsor, a zkSNACKs co-founder, had published in August 2017. Version 2.0, released on 15 June 2022, replaced it with WabiSabi, a protocol published in 2021 by Adam Ficsor, Yuval Kogman, Lucas Ontivero and István András Seres.

In ZeroLink, as in Whirlpool, outputs had fixed amounts and the coordinator signed them with blind signatures. WabiSabi uses keyed-verification anonymous credentials and homomorphic value commitments instead. When a client registers an input, it receives credentials for its value; it then presents them, over a different Tor identity, to register outputs of whatever amounts it chooses within that value, so the coordinator can check that nobody takes out more than they put in without learning which inputs pay for which outputs. Because outputs need not share one fixed amount, a coinjoin can mix a whole balance and leave much less unmixed change, but it needs many inputs of similar value to work well. Wasabi sends all of its communication over Tor by default; its documentation says that without Tor the coordinator would know the links between a user's inputs and outputs from their IP address. The coordinator sets the minimum input, 5,000 sats plus mining fees by default.

zkSNACKs ran Wasabi's default coordinator until 1 June 2024, when it shut the service down, saying it needed to regain more certainty about the law. Version 2.0.8, released that day, added a setting for a coordinator of the user's choice, and the code moved to a new WalletWasabi organisation on GitHub. Users now find coordinators through announcements on Nostr relays or community statistics sites such as LiquiSabi, which the documentation says to use with caution. Version 2.1.0.0 of 10 July 2024 lets each client set its own minimum number of inputs per round and maximum fee, to protect it against malicious coordinators, and version 2.2.0.0 of 20 September 2024 removed the coordination fee altogether: the client now joins only rounds in which it pays nothing but mining fees, although the documentation says a coordinator may still be paid by collecting the leftovers of each coinjoin. Coordinators may also exclude coins from their rounds.

Beyond coinjoins, Wasabi can send to silent payment addresses but cannot yet receive them, and its send box accepts PayJoin links. Users can exclude coins from coinjoins, and since version 2.8.0, released on 27 June 2026, they can pay recipients directly inside a coinjoin, which batches payments without showing that they come from the same sender and hides the size of the change from the receiver. The latest release when this profile was checked was 2.8.4, of 13 October 2026.

Coinjoin volume over time

No daily history for Wasabi Wallet is held on this site. Wasabi Wallet holds no deposits, so it has no TVL, and no free public source of daily figures for the number or value of its coinjoins was found when this profile was checked on 23 Oct 2026. What public data can show is set out on its card in the Bitcoin privacy section of Protocols.

What it hides and what it does not

What it hides

  • Which outputs of a coinjoin belong to which inputs: many users' coins are combined in one transaction, and outputs can be broken into amounts that other participants share.
  • From the coordinator, which inputs pay for which outputs: anonymous credentials let a client register its outputs over a separate Tor identity without revealing which of its inputs fund them.
  • The user's IP address: all communication goes over Tor by default.
  • In a payment made inside a coinjoin, that several payments come from the same sender, and the size of the sender's change.

What it does not hide

  • That a coin took part in a coinjoin, and where each coin came from: the coinjoins are large, recognisable transactions and every input is visible on chain.
  • Change that cannot be broken into amounts shared with others, which can stay linked to its inputs.
  • To a coordinator that cheats, potentially the links between users' coins: a flaw disclosed in December 2024 let a malicious coordinator sort clients by sending them different round parameters, and a co-author of WabiSabi wrote that light clients cannot check the ownership proofs a coordinator relays.
  • Without Tor, the links between a user's inputs and outputs, to the coordinator, from the user's IP address.

Drawn from how it works, above; the sources are listed at the end of the page. Where privacy still leaks explains the patterns, such as timing and amounts, that can give users of any design away.

Audits

None found when this profile was checked on 23 Oct 2026.

Incidents

Six incidents, oldest first: flaws, exploits, sanctions, prosecutions and other events that affected the project or its users.

  1. zkSNACKs announced that its default coordinator would start refusing certain coins from registering in coinjoins. Its chief executive, Bálint Harmat, said the move was proactive and about the company's reputation, and that no law required it; co-founder Adam Ficsor had written that the company would have to hire a blockchain analysis firm to filter input registrations. Only zkSNACKs' own coordinator applied the filter.

    Source: Wasabi Wallet Explains New Bitcoin Censorship Bitcoin Magazine, 17 Mar 2022

  2. Three days after the arrest of Samourai Wallet's founders, zkSNACKs said that, 'in light of recent announcements by U.S. authorities', it was blocking US citizens and residents from its websites and from downloading and using Wasabi Wallet and its related services, with IP address blocking on wasabiwallet.io, api.wasabiwallet.io and zksnacks.com.

    Source: zkSNACKs is Now Blocking U.S. Residents and Citizens (Internet Archive copy) Wasabi Wallet blog (zkSNACKs), 27 Apr 2024

  3. zkSNACKs shut down its coinjoin coordinator, as it had announced on 2 May 2024, saying it had always tried to operate under legal clarity and needed to regain more certainty before moving forward. The shutdown also affected other software that used its coordinator, such as Trezor Suite and BTCPay Server, while Wasabi kept working as an ordinary wallet; version 2.0.8 let users pick another coordinator.

    Sources: zkSNACKs is Discontinuing its Coinjoin Coordination Service 1st of June (Internet Archive copy) Wasabi Wallet blog (zkSNACKs), 2 May 2024; Wasabi Wallet v2.0.8 release GitHub, WalletWasabi, 1 Jun 2024

  4. Exploit

    Wasabi's maintainers reported a series of attacks over 9 and 10 July 2024: the Windows installer of version 2.0.8.1 on GitHub was replaced with a different file after an account with write access was compromised, which a monitoring bot spotted from the changed hash; several free coordinators, mainly the busiest, were repeatedly taken down by denial-of-service attacks; and a coordinator exploited a fee weakness to charge users the maximum fee. The file was removed and access rights revoked, and version 2.1.0.0 let clients cap the fees and set the minimum round size they accept.

    Sources: July 9th-10th 2024: Wasabi Wallet Security Incident Disclosure (discussion #13249) GitHub, WalletWasabi, 10 Jul 2024; Wasabi Wallet v2.1.0.0 release GitHub, WalletWasabi, 10 Jul 2024

  5. The team behind Ginger Wallet, a fork of Wasabi, disclosed that a malicious coordinator could send different round parameters to different clients and so sort their inputs and outputs into groups by credential issuer, linking users to their coins, and linking activity across wallets in the same app. It listed Wasabi 2.2.1.0 and earlier, Ginger Wallet 2.0.13 and earlier and the BTCPay coinjoin plugin 1.0.101.0 and earlier as affected, said it believed the flaw was not being exploited after testing three popular coordinators, and named no fixed version.

    Source: Vulnerability Report: Privacy Issue in WabiSabi Protocol (discussion #116) GitHub, GingerPrivacy, 9 Dec 2024

  6. Yuval Kogman, a co-author of the WabiSabi paper, wrote to the bitcoindev mailing list that the disclosure of 9 December covered only part of a wider problem: a malicious coordinator can give clients inconsistent round identifiers to split them into groups, and, because it supplies the key used to check other clients' ownership proofs, can forge proofs that light clients accept, since they cannot check them without blockchain data. He concluded that the software should not be used unless users trust the coordinators with their privacy. In April 2025 he wrote that none of the concerns he had raised had been addressed or refuted, though he saw no reason to think they had been exploited.

    Sources: Reiterating centralized coinjoin (Wasabi & Samourai) deanonymization attacks bitcoindev mailing list (Google Groups), 21 Dec 2024; Re: Reiterating centralized coinjoin (Wasabi & Samourai) deanonymization attacks bitcoindev mailing list (mirror by b10c), 9 Apr 2025

Milestones

Nine milestones, oldest first.

  1. ZeroLink, a framework for coinjoins run by a coordinator, was published by Adam Ficsor with support from TDev; Wasabi 1.0 implemented it.

    Source: Coinjoin (topic page) Bitcoin Optech

  2. Wasabi Wallet 1.0 was released, a full ZeroLink coinjoin implementation that Bitcoin Optech describes as an efficient alternative to JoinMarket for less technical users.

    Source: Coinjoin (topic page) Bitcoin Optech

  3. The WabiSabi paper, on centrally coordinated coinjoins with variable amounts, was published after public discussion; the IACR's preprint archive received it on 1 March 2021.

    Sources: Coinjoin (topic page) Bitcoin Optech; WabiSabi: Centrally Coordinated CoinJoins with Variable Amounts (Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/206) International Association for Cryptologic Research, 1 Mar 2021

  4. Wasabi Wallet 2.0 was launched with the WabiSabi protocol and coinjoins that run automatically.

    Source: Coinjoin (topic page) Bitcoin Optech

  5. Version 2.0.8, released as zkSNACKs' coordinator closed, added a setting for a coordinator of the user's choice, and the repository moved from zkSNACKs to the WalletWasabi organisation.

    Source: Wasabi Wallet v2.0.8 release GitHub, WalletWasabi, 1 Jun 2024

  6. Version 2.1.0.0 let clients set their own minimum number of inputs and maximum coordination fee, to protect them against malicious coordinators.

    Source: Wasabi Wallet v2.1.0.0 release GitHub, WalletWasabi, 10 Jul 2024

  7. Version 2.2.0.0 removed the coordination fee 'to avoid introducing unknown incentives and to limit risk to users': only coordinators that charge no coordination fee are still supported.

    Source: Wasabi Wallet v2.2.0.0 release GitHub, WalletWasabi, 20 Sep 2024

  8. Version 2.8.0 let users pay recipients directly inside a coinjoin and pay several addresses in one transaction.

    Sources: Wasabi Wallet v2.8.0 release GitHub, WalletWasabi, 27 Jun 2026; Bitcoin Optech Newsletter (Wasabi Wallet 2.8.0 adds the ability to pay recipients directly within a coinjoin) Bitcoin Optech, 24 Jul 2026

  9. Version 2.8.4, the latest release when this profile was checked, added privacy features, interface improvements and bug fixes.

    Sources: Wasabi Wallet v2.8.4 release GitHub, WalletWasabi, 13 Oct 2026; WalletWasabi releases feed GitHub, WalletWasabi, 13 Oct 2026

Funding

One source of funding. Amounts are in US dollars; a dash means the sources give no US dollar figure.

DateRoundAmountInvestors

Purchase of existing shares: Cypherpunk Holdings bought 4.5% of zkSNACKs' ordinary shares from its founding shareholders for an aggregate price of $337,500, in a currency the release does not state, so no money went to the company; its chief investment officer, Moe Adham, joined zkSNACKs' board

Sources: Cypherpunk Holdings Inc. Takes 4.5% Stake in Wasabi Wallet Cypherpunk Holdings (via Newsfile), 21 Nov 2019; Cypherpunk Holdings Inc. Takes 4.5% Stake in Wasabi Wallet (filing copy) Canadian Securities Exchange, 21 Nov 2019

 – Cypherpunk Holdings

Risks

Privacy depends on the coordinator and on how busy its rounds are. Since zkSNACKs closed its coordinator in June 2024, users pick independent coordinators, some of whose operators do not name themselves, such as the one at kruw.io, and whose code cannot be checked from outside: Yuval Kogman, a co-author of WabiSabi, wrote in April 2025 that client code is public but it is not possible to verify what software coordinator operators run, and that none of the weaknesses he had raised had been addressed or refuted, though he saw no reason to think they had been exploited. A malicious coordinator could link users' coins through the flaw disclosed in December 2024, and in July 2024 one charged users the maximum fee before clients could cap it. Coordinators have also been knocked offline by denial-of-service attacks, and coinjoin users are spread across several of them, so the number of others in a round depends on the coordinator chosen: the kruw.io coordinator's monitor listed three just-ended rounds of 104 to 111 inputs on 16 October 2026. No free public figures for total coinjoin volume were found. The 2024 replacement of a Windows installer on GitHub shows the value of checking each download's signature. Legal exposure remains: zkSNACKs stopped serving US users and closed its coordinator after the US prosecution of Samourai Wallet's founders, citing a need for legal certainty, and coordinator operators may face the same questions. No independent security audit of Wasabi or of WabiSabi was found.

Sources

The documents this profile rests on. Each audit, incident, milestone and funding round above also links its own sources.

Checked on 23 Oct 2026. Confidence: confirmed. Information only, not investment, legal or tax advice.

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