Audits counted
112
By 54 auditors, 2016 to 2026
Audits
Published security reviews of the private DeFi protocols, privacy coins and privacy networks this site follows: who reviewed what and when, what they found, and whether the code they reviewed is the code deployed.
Protocols audited
22
Most: Privacy Cash, 17 audits
Reports linked
84 of 112
Published reports this page links
Deployed code
3 of 112
Say the audited code is, at least in part, the code deployed
All audits
Every audit found, newest first and those without a date last, with its scope, its findings as stated and a link to the report where one is published.
112 audits.
| Date | Protocol | Auditor | Scope | Findings | Audited code deployed | Report and sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firo | Cypher Stack, with HashCloak | Review, with the Firo core team, of the fix for the multi-input Spark forgery flaw disclosed in August 2026, released as a new versioned Spark spend format in v0.14.18.0; the project said the earlier cryptography and code audits had not caught the flaw. No separate report was published with the release. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Monero | Trail of Bits | Incremental changes to Monero's core cryptography libraries for FCMP++, two engineer-weeks funded by community donors through MAGIC Grants. |
Six informational findings and none of low, medium or high severity; one finding on a Rust FFI function was only partly resolved. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Aztec Network | Internal and external reviewers (not named) | Aztec said that internal and external human audits of Alpha V5 had been completed and that AI-assisted auditing continues, and that its bug bounty on Cantina had drawn more than 234 security researchers; it has not named the firms or published the V5 reports. The date is that of the post. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Zcash | Shielded Labs (audit carried out by an independent researcher) | Ongoing, AI-assisted security audit of the Orchard protocol, commissioned by Shielded Labs; the date is when the researcher reported the flaw it found. | Found the Orchard soundness flaw closed by the June 2026 emergency soft fork and NU6.2 (see Incidents). |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Privacy Cash | HashCloak | EVM SDK, finalised on 29 April 2026 and updated on 26 May 2026 (version 2.0). |
Two low-severity findings, both acknowledged and left unchanged. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Boost | OpenZeppelin | The privacy-boost-protocol repository at commit 7b2a018, reviewed from 11 February to 4 March 2026 for Sunnyside Labs; the date is when the report was published. |
33 issues: one critical, six medium, 13 low and 13 notes; 27 resolved and one partly resolved. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Zigtur | EVM SDK (version 1.1). |
A medium issue that wrote UTXO private keys to a temporary file was fixed; a low issue on reliance on the centralised indexer was acknowledged. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | HashCloak | EVM pool contracts and circuits for ETH on Base, finalised on 17 March 2026, with updated versions up to 21 August 2026 covering the USDC pool and deployments on Ethereum, BNB Chain and Robinhood Chain. |
One low and five informational findings. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Zigtur | EVM pool contracts (version 1.2), updated on 5 April 2026 (version 1.3) for the ERC-20 pool. |
Low and informational findings only, including bypassable fees and notes on the UUPS upgrade pattern. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Nethermind | EVM pool contracts (report NM-0853), including checks that the on-chain verifier matches the circuit and its trusted setup, which recorded four contributions, and that proofs are compatible between the Solana and EVM versions. |
Three informational findings. |
In partThe review checked that the on-chain verifier matches the circuit and its trusted setup. | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Zigtur | Support for multiple SPL tokens in the Solana program and SDK (version 1.0), updated on 10 February 2026 (version 1.3) to cover stORE, jlUSDC and jlWSOL. |
One medium issue, a wrong ORE address in the SDK, was fixed. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Veridise | Solana program and circuits at commit 4b2ec49, reviewed from 10 to 14 November 2025 for SPL token support (report V3); the Picus tool was used to prove the circuits deterministic. |
A critical flaw that could have drained the pool was fixed before the change was merged; two warnings were acknowledged. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Accretion | SPL token transfer feature of the Solana program, reviewed from 20 November to 8 December 2025 (report A25PRC2). |
One high-severity issue, which let users make the relayer pay token account costs, was marked won't fix. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Zigtur | USDC integration in the Solana program (version 1.1). |
A high-severity flaw that let SOL deposits be withdrawn as USDC was fixed by giving each token its own Merkle tree. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| zERC20 | zkSecurity | INTMAX's zERC20 repository at commit 69537e95 (the zk-audit-target release): circuit correctness and the Solidity integration code, over two weeks from 8 December 2025 with two consultants. |
Three low and three informational findings, by the severity in each finding's heading (the report gives no summary count), and a deployment note on the LayerZero configuration. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Sherlock | Private best-efforts audit contest held from 13 to 17 November 2025 on the circuits, Solana program and encryption primitives, with the final commit being the merge that added USDC support. |
No high or medium issues reported. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zama | OpenZeppelin | Release 0.3.0 of OpenZeppelin's confidential contracts library, reviewed from 20 to 31 October 2025, covering the ERC-7984 token and its extensions, including the ERC-20 wrapper, freezing, observer access and restrictions. |
13 issues, one of medium severity; 12 resolved. |
NoZama's deployed wrappers are ported from the library's later 0.4.0 release. | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Zigtur | Solana program and circuits at commit 5496860, plus two later commits (version 1.6); the trusted setup ceremony was not assessed. |
Seven informational findings. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Zigtur | TypeScript SDK for Solana (version 1.1). | Findings on privacy leaks through RPC queries and the indexer's Merkle proof service were acknowledged and not fixed. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Aztec Network | Veridise | The Bigfield library in Barretenberg, Aztec's proving library, reviewed from 14 July to 1 August 2025 over 9 person-weeks; no findings. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | Accretion | Solana program for private SOL transfers, reviewed from 27 June to 16 August 2025 (report A25PRC1). |
Two critical issues, both fixed: one let the tree authority lock funds, the other allowed front-running and theft through missing recipient validation. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Cash | HashCloak | Solana program, Circom circuits and the web app's proving code, first delivered on 4 July 2025 and finalised on 9 August 2025; later versions, up to 18 June 2026, cover USDC and other SPL token support. | A critical double-spend flaw found after the first delivery was listed, as fixed, in the update of 1 September 2025 and later re-reviewed. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Informal Systems | End-to-end review of shielded transactions and balance consistency. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Monero | Veridise | FCMP++ membership-proof circuit code (the src, circuit-abstraction and ec-gadgets folders), reviewed from 7 April to 2 May 2025 for MAGIC Grants. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Pools | Oxorio | An upgrade to the version 1 Entrypoint that rejects reused deposit precommitments, to prevent stuck funds. |
One warning and one informational finding, both acknowledged without a code change. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zama | OpenZeppelin | Confidential fungible token and ERC-20 wrapper contracts in OpenZeppelin's confidential contracts library for Zama's FHEVM, reviewed from 5 to 16 May 2025. |
Nine issues, none critical, high or medium; seven resolved. |
NoZama's deployed wrappers are an upgradeable port of the library's later 0.4.0 wrapper code, so this review does not cover them directly. | Confirmed |
|
| Renegade | zkSecurity | The dark pool contracts rewritten in Solidity, malleable matches (trades whose size is set at settlement), in-circuit wallet commitments and the Poseidon gadget, over two weeks from 21 April 2025. |
Nine findings: one high, three medium, one low and four informational. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Privacy Pools | Oxorio | Version 1 smart contracts (Entrypoint, the PrivacyPool base contract and its native-asset and ERC-20 versions, State and two libraries), reviewed from 25 February 2025. |
18 findings, no critical and two major; six fixed, six acknowledged without a code change and six judged not to be issues. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zano | Immunefi audit competition | An invite-only audit competition from 17 February to 10 March 2025, with a USD 25,000 reward pool, on about 5,000 lines of Zano's C++ code, focused on its cryptography and core consensus rules, such as Bulletproofs and CLSAG; the assets in scope were not published. Immunefi's report site lists five reports: one of high severity, on JWT salt expiry in the wallet RPC server's authentication, and four rated insight, among them a reported double spend using zero-point stealth address and signature elements in CLSAG-GGX proof verification and a report on breaking asset surjection proof assumptions. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Privacy Pools | Oxorio | Version 1 zero-knowledge circuits (commitment, Merkle tree and withdrawal), reviewed from 31 January 2025. |
10 findings, none critical or major; five fixed, four acknowledged and one judged not an issue. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Informal Systems | Namada governance and public goods funding. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Monero | Cypher Stack | Carrot, the address scheme planned for the FCMP++ upgrade, reviewed in the paper An Audit of the FCMP++ Addressing Protocol; the date is when the final paper was added to Cypher Stack's repository. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Renegade | zkSecurity | The atomic settlement feature: the VALID MATCH SETTLE ATOMIC circuit and its proof linking, the dark pool entry point and the settlement and verifier contracts, at named commits. |
Four findings: one high, two medium and one low. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Hinkal | zkSecurity | One-week review from 2 September 2024 by two consultants of the Circom circuits, the Solidity contracts, the staking actions and the Connext cross-chain contracts at commit 117e8ad. It found two medium issues, a way to bypass blacklisting by minting an access token from a different address (fixed) and encrypted outputs not bound to the verified proofs (acknowledged), two low issues and two informational ones, all fixed, and noted centralisation risks around the contract owner. |
Six findings: two medium, two low and two informational, none high. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Informal Systems | Namada's IBC and MASP integrations. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Informal Systems | The Namada ABCI application, replay protection, and fee and gas metering. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Penumbra | Zellic | Penumbra's IBC implementation (a draft report). |
11 findings: three high (ICS-20 timeouts on ordered channels, upgrade handling and overly permissive handshakes), three medium, one low and four informational, all fixed before a chain upgrade. |
Not stated | Not verified |
|
| Hinkal | Immunefi (public audit competition) | Audit competition from 16 April to 7 May 2024, paying each participating researcher USD 2,500 plus USD 2,500 for each unique critical bug and USD 1,500 for each unique high one; Hinkal lists it as completed. The results were not read for this profile. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Renegade | zkSecurity | Circuits (their specification, linkable proofs and gadgets), the SRS logic, the Arbitrum Stylus smart contracts and the PlonK verifier, over three weeks with two consultants. |
Seven findings: one high, two medium, three low and one informational. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Hinkal | Zokyo | Listed on Hinkal's security audits page among six firms that reviewed its Solidity contracts and Circom circuits; the date is taken from the report's file name. Its findings were not read for this profile. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Aleo | NCC Group | Review of snarkOS and its consensus mechanism, based on a partially synchronous version of the Bullshark protocol, carried out in November 2023 and retested in January 2024; 7 findings. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Aleo | NCC Group | Implementation review of snarkVM, covering the synthesizer, algorithms and ledger: 17 findings, of which 15 were fixed at retest, one medium-severity finding was accepted as a risk and one informational finding was not fixed. | First audit: 17 findings, of which 15 were fixed, one medium-severity finding was risk accepted and one informational finding was not fixed. Second audit: seven issues, pending review when the post was published. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Aleo | zkSecurity | The snarkVM synthesizer and, separately, the snarkOS consensus (its Narwhal and Bullshark implementation, consensus logic and ledger service), with a week-long review of the fixes on 19 February 2024 that found them satisfactory; Aleo said 8 issues were resolved. | Eight issues, listed as resolved. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Aleo | Trail of Bits | The synthesizer and finalize logic of snarkVM and the inter-node communication and Bullshark consensus implementation of snarkOS, Aleo's node software; 31 issues, 1 medium, 4 low, 23 informational and 3 undetermined, including a consensus function that almost always returned false. Aleo said it resolved them, although several were marked won't fix or nothing to fix. | 31 findings; Aleo's post links fixes for 23 and marks 8 as won't fix, nothing to fix or deprecated. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Informal Systems | A Quint specification of cubic proof of stake. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Penumbra | zkSecurity | All the zero-knowledge circuits of release 0.56.0, reviewed by three consultants over five person-weeks from 10 July 2023; 10 issues, 5 informational, including a wrong in-circuit derivation of the incoming viewing key that would have allowed a note to be spent twice and a missing duplicate check that would have allowed double voting, both fixed. The date is that of Penumbra's summary. |
Ten findings: four high, one medium and five informational. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Penumbra | NCC Group | Review of the protocol design, mainly the multi-asset shielded pool extended from Zcash Sapling, the statements proved in zero knowledge and their implementation in Rust; 8 issues, 1 of them critical and 3 informational, all above informational fixed and confirmed in a follow-up review. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Least Authority | The Namada interface and browser extension, with their dependencies, excluding the masp-web component, for Heliax. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zcash | NCC Group | Security assessment, carried out from 27 February to 12 May 2023, of the Zebra node and its cryptographic dependencies for the Zcash Foundation. |
No critical or high findings; one medium, seven low and eight informational issues. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Oak Security | The Namada Ethereum bridge, version 1.0. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Railgun | Zokyo | The Sender and Executor contracts, which sit in the Arbitrum folder of Railgun's governance code and link the Arbitrum deployment to governance on Ethereum. |
No critical issues; some medium, low and informational ones, and a warning that an admin address holds broad powers over cross-chain task execution. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| zkBob | ChainSecurity | The zkBob smart contracts in Solidity (ZkBobPool, BobToken and BobVault), reviewed for functional correctness, access control and front-running. |
Two medium-severity issues on front-running and sandwich attacks; the issues acknowledged and not fixed are of low severity. The circuits were not in scope. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Informal Systems | Formal work on Namada's cubic proof of stake: a TLA+ specification and a model-based testing framework. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Railgun | Zokyo | The Commitments, RailgunLogic and RailgunSmartWallet privacy contracts. |
No critical issues; 2 medium-severity issues were resolved. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Firo | HashCloak | Firo's Lelantus Spark implementation, audited from 24 October to 28 November 2022, with an initial report on 9 December and the final report, noting the core team's fixes, on 19 December 2022; no critical or high-severity issues were found and all other findings were resolved. Cost USD 80,000, funded by the community. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Railgun | Zokyo | The Voting governance contract. | Low-severity and informational issues, reported as resolved or acknowledged. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Penumbra | NCC Group | Review of Penumbra's implementation of decaf377, the group it uses for its cryptography, and of the selection of parameters for the Poseidon hash function. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Aleo | Trail of Bits | Review of snarkVM, Aleo's virtual machine and proof system library; 29 issues, 2 medium, 6 low and 21 informational. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Railgun | HashCloak | Railgun's version 2 zero-knowledge circuits, reviewed from 22 to 29 March 2022, and the Voting contract and GovernorRewards treasury contract, reviewed from 22 to 29 August 2022. |
7 issues, 3 of them high severity and none critical, all reported as resolved. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Namada | Inference (JP Aumasson) | Review of the multi-asset shielded pool (MASP) circuits and code. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Aztec Connect | Solidified | The Aztec Connect rollup smart contracts, before launch. | Two minor vulnerabilities, both patched, according to Aztec. |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Aztec Connect | Sentnl | Fuzzing audit of the rollup's cryptography, before launch. | Not stated in Aztec's post. |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Railgun | Zokyo | The RAIL token contract (Rail.sol) as deployed on Ethereum. |
No critical issues found. |
Yes, as statedThe RAIL token contract as deployed on Ethereum. | Confirmed |
|
| Railgun | Zokyo | Privacy logic contracts at one commit: RailgunLogic, Commitments, Globals, Snark, Verifier, Poseidon and TokenBlacklist. |
No critical issues found. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Firo | HashCloak | Cryptography of the Lelantus Spark paper, reviewed by Mikerah Quintyne-Collins and her team; no issues were found in relation to counterfeiting of coins or loss of transaction privacy, and errors found in the paper were fixed. Funded jointly by the community and core team funds. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Railgun | Zokyo | The Commitments, Globals and RailgunLogic privacy contracts at a later commit. |
No critical issues; the 2 issues found were resolved. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Railgun | Zokyo | The Railgun contracts at the commit Hacken reviewed, including the Delegator, Voting, Staking, Treasury, Distributor, VestLock, Commitments, RailgunLogic and Verifier contracts. |
No critical issues; one low-severity and a few informational issues were left unresolved because the contracts were already deployed. |
Yes, as statedThe report says the contracts were already deployed. | Confirmed |
|
| Railgun | Hacken | The Railgun contract repository at one commit, covering governance, staking, voting, treasury, token distribution, proxy and privacy logic contracts, reviewed from 25 October 2021 for a client named Right to Privacy. |
2 medium and 2 low-severity issues, with no critical or high ones. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zcash | NCC Group | Cryptography review of the NU5 upgrade (Orchard), commissioned by the Electric Coin Company, covering the specification changes, the relevant ZIPs and the implementation. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zano | Cypher Stack (Sarang Noether) | Review of the Zarcanum proof-of-stake paper, which a Zano report of 18 November 2021 said Sarang Noether of Cypher Stack would carry out at the end of that month; no report or findings were found, so this review is not confirmed. The paper was also put on the IACR ePrint archive for peer review. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Zcash | QEDIT | NU5 audit, from 21 April to 24 September 2021, of the Halo 2 proving system, the Orchard protocol and its Action circuit, their primitives and key derivation, and related ZIPs and code. |
No critical issues; 7 warning-level and 19 minor issues. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Tornado Cash | ZeroPool | Tornado Cash Nova (Tornado Pool) zkSNARK circuits and Solidity contracts, including a version with Optimism (OVM) support, reviewed by an independent reviewer from ZeroPool. |
No critical or major issues; seven warnings and two comments. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Railgun | ABDK Consulting | Railgun's first Solidity contracts (Commitments, RailgunLogic, Snark, TokenWhitelist, Types and Verifier) and Circom circuits (JoinSplit, MerkleTree and others); version 2.0 of the report, which followed version 1.0 of 18 June 2021. |
2 critical issues, both fixed; 4 major issues, 3 of them fixed; 57 moderate or minor issues, mostly fixed. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Monero | ZenGo X researchers | Peer review of the Bulletproofs+ paper and review of Monero's Bulletproofs+ code, about 1,500 lines of C++, funded through the CCS with 90.3 XMR; the date is the milestone completion date on the CCS page, which does not link the final report. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Tornado Cash | ABDK Consulting | First audit of the anonymity mining (Tornado Farm) smart contracts and circuits, reviewed from private files. |
One critical issue in the reward circuit, which it recommended fixing, along with moderate flaws and suboptimal code. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Firo | Trail of Bits | Lelantus cryptographic library, reviewed by engineers Jim Miller and Will Song; the library largely complied with the specification, with one medium-severity and one informational issue, and a high-severity issue was found in unfinished integration code. Funded mostly by 105 community contributions totalling 5,569.55 XZC, with the rest from the development fund. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
|
| Monero | JP Aumasson and Antony Vennard (with OSTIF) | The CLSAG ring signature scheme in two stages, first its security model and proofs, then the implementation; funded through the CCS. | No security issues; two security proofs were revised, and the code was described as secure and well written. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Tornado Cash | ABDK Consulting | Review of the mixer protocol design and its implementation (version 1.1). | Recommendations included using one hash function rather than two, and a stronger curve than BN254, which it put at about 100 bits of security. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Tornado Cash | ABDK Consulting | The circom zero-knowledge circuits (final version). | No major issues; a few minor issues, many of them fixed. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Tornado Cash | ABDK Consulting | Tornado Cash smart contracts (final version). |
No critical issues; other significant issues were fixed and some minor ones were left for later releases or ignored. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Aztec Network | ConsenSys Diligence | The smart contract system of the original AZTEC protocol for confidential transactions on Ethereum, an earlier design than today's network, at an early commit; the zero-knowledge constructions were out of scope, and the report says the code changed significantly afterwards. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zcash | NCC Group | Review, commissioned by the Electric Coin Company, of the Overwinter consensus code (26 March to 6 April 2018) and the Rust implementation of Sapling's cryptographic primitives, including its elliptic curves, shielded transaction structure and signature scheme (7 to 18 May 2018), with retesting on 4 and 5 September 2018; the date is when the public report was published. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zcash | Least Authority | Review of the Sapling implementation and the RPC interface (updated report; a final report was due after a verification phase). | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Monero | Quarkslab | Monero's Bulletproofs implementation, audited from 18 April to 17 July 2018. | Four major and three medium issues, as described in the report; publication waited for a denial-of-service fix in release 0.13.0. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zcash | Least Authority | Review of the Overwinter and Sapling protocol specification, version 2018.0-beta-20 (final report). | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Monero | Kudelski Security | Monero's Bulletproofs range-proof implementation before activation, sponsored by the Monero Research Lab, the Monero community, Private Internet Access and OSTIF, which published the results. |
Four low-severity bugs, all patched, and several informational issues. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zcash | Least Authority | Implementation analysis of zcashd 1.0.15 and review of the Overwinter specification (final report). | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Zcash | NCC Group | Review, commissioned in August 2016, of how the Zcash implementation follows the protocol specification, its cryptographic code, and the C++ code of Zcash and the libsnark library. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
|
| Not dated | Monero | Trail of Bits, X41 D-Sec, Kudelski Security and Quarkslab | The RandomX proof-of-work algorithm before its November 2019 activation: four independent audits between May and August 2019 (the README gives no single completion date), coordinated by OSTIF, three of them funded by Monero community donations. |
No critical vulnerabilities; several changes to the algorithm and code followed. |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Privacy Cash | Kriko | Solana program and circuit at commit 5496860, plus two later commits. The report is undated; this version's PDF was generated on 28 October 2025, and an earlier version, generated on 10 September 2025, was in the repository from 24 September 2025. |
Two informational findings. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Privacy Cash | Kriko | Upgrade adding SPL tokens to the Solana program at commit 4b2ec49, with a mitigation review and a check of later token additions. The report is undated; its PDF was generated on 18 December 2025. |
A critical flaw that let users withdraw a different token from the one deposited was fixed. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Privacy Cash | Kriko | EVM contracts at commit 3a5acf7 and the USDC upgrade at commit 1e9af6a. The reports are undated; their PDFs were generated on 16 March and 6 April 2026. |
Three low-severity gas-griefing issues were addressed in the contracts or the team's infrastructure; the USDC review found no further issues. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Privacy Pools | Auditware | The seven version 1 contract files that Oxorio reviewed. The report carries no date and was added to 0xbow's repository on 19 March 2025. |
Six findings, three medium and three low: three mitigated, one partly mitigated, one acknowledged and one judged no risk by design. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Zama | Trail of Bits | Listed in Trail of Bits' public library as a security review of Zama dated October 2025, without a day; the listing names no components and links only to Zama's litepaper, not to a report. Zama names Trail of Bits among the firms that audited the protocol. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Zama | Zenith | Named by Zama, in its November 2025 testnet update and in its litepaper, as one of the protocol's auditors; Zama says the audits together covered every component of the protocol but does not say which firm reviewed which, and links no report. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Zama | Burrasec | Named by Zama in its November 2025 testnet update as one of the firms that audited the protocol; Zama says the audits together covered every component but does not say which firm reviewed which, and links no report. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Zama | Alexandra Institute | Named by Zama in its November 2025 testnet update as one of the firms that audited the protocol; Zama says the audits together covered every component but does not say which firm reviewed which, and links no report. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Zcash | Mary Maller (cryptography researcher) | Review of the Halo 2 security proof and protocol used by Orchard, listed among the NU5 security audits on the Zcash website, which gives no date for it. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Panther Protocol | Veridise | Panther Protocol's core smart contracts and zero-knowledge circuits (version 8 of the report, uploaded in November 2025). | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Not verified |
| Not dated | Aztec Network | Solidified | External smart contract audit of Aztec Connect, Aztec's earlier privacy rollup, named in Aztec's May 2022 bug bounty post alongside a review by Sentnl and internal audits; the same post said no cryptography audit had been done, because Aztec had not found a firm with the expertise. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Penumbra | Zellic | Application audit of the shielded pool, staking and exchange components: 16 findings, 5 critical, among them dummy spends that allowed minting arbitrary funds, forged delegation tokens that raised voting power and colliding position IDs that allowed withdrawing more than was deposited; all but the informational one were fixed. Penumbra Labs summarised it on 7 June 2024 and gives no report date. |
16 findings: five critical, five high, three medium, two low and one informational. |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Penumbra | Violet | Review of the zero-knowledge circuits: 1 critical finding, which let attackers claim swap outputs at the clearing price of a different batch, fixed in pull request 4239, and 3 informational ones. Summarised by Penumbra Labs on 7 June 2024. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Penumbra | Electric Coin Company | Further review of the zero-knowledge circuits, commissioned as extra assurance: 1 high finding, which concerned only a planned future design with flow encryption and so needed no change for mainnet, 2 low, 1 informational and 2 about incomplete documentation. Summarised by Penumbra Labs on 7 June 2024. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Namada | Antithesis | Continuous simulation, testing and quality assurance of the Namada protocol, listed as ongoing on Namada's security page, with no report published. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Firo | ABDK Consulting (Dmitry Khovratovich) | Cryptography of the Lelantus protocol rather than its implementation, paid for by the development fund; in August 2020 Zcoin expected the results within one to two weeks, and the report on Firo's research page carries no date. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Firo | Daniel (Linfeng) Zhao | A second cryptography audit of Lelantus Spark, listed on Firo's research page with its report; the page gives no date or findings summary. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Pirate Chain | Not named in the sources found | A code security review of the Pirate wallet is linked from Pirate Chain's website and from exchange listing pages, but the page could not be read when this profile was checked, so its author, scope and findings are not confirmed. No audit of the chain's consensus code was found. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Umbra Privacy | No firm named (the project's own reviews by AI models) | The documentation says the programs, circuits and services have been audited repeatedly by frontier AI models from several providers, that the findings feed back into the code, and that it keeps machine-checked Lean 4 models of the circuits, the double-spend checks, governance and the verifiers, with fuzzing. It names no audit firm and publishes no report, date or findings (page updated 13 October 2026). | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Hinkal | Quantstamp | Listed on Hinkal's security audits page, with a Quantstamp certificate for the Hinkal protocol; no date is given there, and the report was not read for this profile. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Hinkal | Secure3 | Listed on Hinkal's security audits page; no date is given there, and the report was not read for this profile. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | Confirmed |
| Not dated | Hinkal | Hexens | Listed on Hinkal's security audits page, linked to a report file; no date is given there, and the report was not read for this profile. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
| Not dated | Hinkal | Neodyme | Listed on Hinkal's security audits page, linked to a report file; no date is given there, and the report was not read for this profile. Hinkal also runs a bug bounty on HackenProof, whose critical issues include unauthorised withdrawal of shielded funds, forged proofs and nullifier reuse enabling double spends. | Not summarised in the sources cited |
Not stated | No report linked Reported |
No audits match these filters.
What the list covers
What the table shows
- An audit
- A security review by an outside firm or researcher of a protocol's code, circuits, cryptography or design, as published by the auditor or the project. An audit covers the code and the time it names; it does not make a protocol safe, and a listing here is not an endorsement of the protocol or the auditor.
- Findings
- As the report or its publisher states them. Counts by severity are shown only where a source gives them in the usual terms (critical, high, medium, low and informational); other terms, such as major or warning, stay in the text.
- Audited code deployed
- Whether a source says the audited code is the code running on the chain: 2 say it is, 1 in part, 2 say it is not, and 107 do not say. Code changed after an audit is not covered by it.
- Dates
- When the report was issued, unless the entry says otherwise; 24 have no date in their sources.
- Confidence
- Of the 112 audits, 82 rest on a report or the auditor's or project's own page (Confirmed), 28 on a project or auditor naming the review without a report (Reported) and 2 on reports that could not be opened in full (Not verified).
Coverage
- Protocols
- Privacy Cash 17, Namada 10, Railgun 10, Zcash 10, Monero 8, Hinkal 7, Penumbra 7, Firo 6, Zama 6, Aleo 5, Tornado Cash 5, Aztec Network 4, Privacy Pools 4, Renegade 3, Aztec Connect 2, Zano 2, Panther Protocol 1, Pirate Chain 1, Privacy Boost 1, Umbra Privacy 1, zERC20 1, zkBob 1.
- Searched, none found
- No published audit was found for Shield Swap, Umbra Privacy, Cyclone, Nullmask, Sherwood, Murk Finance, Tonnel Network, Veil Cash or Shade Protocol's ShadeSwap and ShadeLend, and the smaller pools on the Protocols page were not searched one by one. Some projects name further auditors without publishing reports, and those are listed only where the project names them.
- Incidents
- Of the audited protocols, Aleo, Aztec Connect, Aztec Network, Firo, Hinkal, Monero, Namada, Panther Protocol, Pirate Chain, Privacy Cash, Privacy Pools, Railgun, Renegade, Tornado Cash, Zama, Zano, Zcash and zkBob also appear on the Incidents page. An audit covers only the code and the time it names, so a later flaw or exploit may lie in code it did not review.
Every entry was checked on 23 Oct 2026, and each links the documents it rests on. The list can be downloaded as audits.csv from the Data page. Information only, not investment advice.